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#### ETHIOPIA

The moderate majority on the ruling Armed Forces Coordinating Committee has decided to use force to subdue its opponents within the military. This marks a sharp departure from the policy, followed since the military revolt in February, of avoiding confrontation between military units and attempting to resolve differences through debate and negotiation.

Increased tensions within the coordinating committee in recent weeks, however, have seriously eroded military unity. The moderates believe they are now strong enough to make a show of strength, following the recent reinforcement of units that support their aims.


The committee yesterday sent troops from the 4th Division to arrest officers and men of a dissident army engineer battalion in Addis Ababa. A skirmish broke out, and four men reportedly were killed and seven wounded. Addis Ababa radio later announced that officers and men of the engineer battalion and an army aviation unit had been arrested for attempting to "disrupt the progress of the revolution."

The chance of a major military confrontation hinges mainly on the reaction of elements of the 1st Division that provide the most potent opposition to the committee. Most of the 1st Division's dissidents, however, are found in only one of its four brigades.

The 4th Division in Addis Ababa, which generally supports the committee, has been reinforced in recent days by troops and artillery from outlying areas. Some of the troops have come from the 3rd Division, in eastern Ethiopia. The troops in Addis Ababa supporting the committee are now superior in numbers to dissident 1st Division forces. The dissidents might pick up support from other opponents of the committee, however, and there is a possibility of serious clashes as the arrests continue.

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#### USSR

Several recent Soviet statements have suggested continued concern about the military and political implications of new US policies calling for more flexible and varied use of nuclear weapons. These policies, as enunciated several times during the past year by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, would permit selective and flexible US retaliatory strikes against Soviet targets. Soviet concerns probably have been brought to a new focus by the resumption of the strategic arms negotiations.

G. A. Trofimenko, a senior military policy analyst at Moscow's USA Institute, has been notably outspoken. At the annual Dartmouth Conference between Soviet and American arms-control experts in April, Trofimenko claimed that the US was trying to gain psychological leverage. He said that targeting could not be verified in any way and the policy could imply that the US possessed new advantages in its strategic arsenal.

In a recent conversation with the US defense attaché in Moscow, Trofimenko claimed that a small strike by the US might still trigger a massive Soviet response. In addition, he said that such a policy could make US attack aircraft carriers fair game because they constituted "very important, discrete military targets that can be struck without difficulty and surgically, without impact on nearby population centers."

At a Moscow conference of US and Soviet academic specialists on East-West affairs in late September, Soviet spokesmen, including Trofimenko, argued that US interest in a broad range of options against military targets meant that US policy was returning to the development of a first-strike counterforce capability. When questioned about the counterforce content of Soviet military doctrine, one Soviet participant asserted that in all-out war, Soviet doctrine called for extensive

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counterforce operations, but that no provisions for limited use of nuclear weapons existed. The prevailing theme from these Soviet spokesmen was that new US targeting policies represented an attempt to gain a bargaining advantage over the Soviet Union and were therefore inimical to detente.

Commentary on US targeting policy from Soviet military figures has been somewhat less energetic. In general, senior Soviet officers have shown less concern with the strategic implications of the new US policy than with what they regard as the impropriety of high US officials' publicly discussing this issue in a period of detente.

The Soviets have probably not sorted out the full implications of the new US policy beyond making it clear that this is not what they want to hear, at least publicly, from the US. Much Soviet commentary on this subject, especially from the institute specialists, may not be backed by knowledge of Soviet military policy and posture pertinent to limited employment of nuclear weapons.

Whether or not so intended, projected improvements to Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces will enhance Soviet capabilities for flexible and selective nuclear strike options.

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#### USSR

The recent effort by Moscow to buy 2.4 million tons of corn and 1 million tons of wheat probably stemmed from expectations that the Soviet grain crop will fall short of requirements and that world grain prices will rise.

Soviet grain requirements this year will be 200-210 million tons, but the crop will probably reach about 195 million tons because of harvesting difficulties and poor corn prospects. Cool summer weather has prevented a substantial part of the corn crop from reaching maturity.

It had seemed likely that the Soviets would reduce reserves—a record 20-30 million tons—rather than import much grain at today's high prices. They had contracted previously for only about 1.5 million tons for delivery in FY 1975. Only last month, a high Soviet trade official claimed the USSR would make no large purchases of US grain in the near future.

The Soviets may well have concluded that using a large part of their reserves would place them in a precarious position if the harvest next year were poor. They probably also believe that continuing tight world grain supplies will drive prices even higher next year.



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#### SOUTH KOREA

President Pak Chong-hui's government has made it clear in the past several days that it intends to take a tough line with domestic dissidents between now and late November, when President Ford visits Seoul.

Earlier reporting had indicated that the government would attempt to fashion a more conciliatory policy toward anti-Pak student and Christian groups and the increasingly aggressive major opposition party. Some flexibility on the part of the government and a few conciliatory gestures are not being ruled out, but the regime is unmistakably in a "get tough" mood.

Pak himself set the tone recently in his speech on Armed Forces Day. He sharply criticized "idealists" who, he charged, do not appreciate the seriousness of the threat from the North and the need for strong national discipline in the South. Since then, a number of top leaders, in conversations with US officials, have confirmed that the government intends to take no chance that the opposition forces might get out of hand.

Student and Christian groups have been keeping a relatively low profile recently, following a limited resumption of protest meetings and petitioning late last month. Such groups may have been awaiting a promised attack on the government in the National Assembly by newly elected opposition leader Kim Yong-sam.

Kim issued an aggressive challenge to the government yesterday, assailing the "one-man dictatorship" and "repressive" policies of the Pak government. In his first major policy speech in the new National Assembly session, Kim called for the release of students and other protesters imprisoned during the summer under the emergency decrees. Kim warned that if democratic reforms were not carried out, he might lead an extralegal protest movement.

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Pak has indicated that he will be reluctant to take action against the opposition as long as it confines itself to debate within the National Assembly. Still, he is unlikely to let Kim's latest speech pass without a There is also a good chance that other opposition forces will take Kim's speech as a call for renewed action. The prospects have thus increased for confrontations between government and opposition in the weeks ahead.

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#### FOR THE RECORD

Cyprus: Greek Cypriot leader Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash resumed their talks on the exchange of prisoners and related issues yesterday. two leaders reportedly resolved the "practical difficulties" involved in the exchange, which was suspended on September 26 after 1,946 of 5,298 prisoners had been released. They also had a private exchange of views on various political questions. The next meeting is planned for October 14.

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